Introduction
conceptualizes social capital as "…features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions." Although the concept of social capital is frequently used in rather vague ways by a large part of the social sciences literature, the key element is that 'relationships matter' (Field, 2003) . Social interaction enables members to share values and build societies. Therefore, social networks (and the relations of trust, tolerance and cooperation arising from them) allow members to resolve their collective problems more easily, facilitate community progress, and achieve goals.
The World Bank claims that "Increasing evidence shows that social cohesionsocial capital -is critical for poverty alleviation and sustainable human and economic development
1 ". In fact, there have been a growing number of efforts attempting to quantify the influence of social capital on economic development, as we discuss in the main text. Furthermore, several authors have linked the HIV/AIDS epidemic to social capital (see for instance Gaffeo, 2003) , usually pointing out how factors related to the disease such as stigma, discrimination and the costs posed by care for the sick as well as orphans erode and put pressure on social capital.
The objective of this paper is to attempt to quantify the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on social capital using cross-country data. For this purpose, we will estimate reduced form regressions of the main determinants, as identified in the literature, of social capital, using national levels of trust from the World Values Survey (WVS) as a proxy for social capital. To our knowledge, there have been no previous efforts to evaluate this empirical question. Establishing an empirical link between the HIV/AIDS epidemic and "trust" helps uncover another channel through which social capital affects development.
With this objective in mind, in section 2 we briefly examine the links between social capital, development and HIV/AIDS previously identified in the literature. In section 3 we present and discuss the data used in our cross-country regressions. Section 4 presents our empirical results and discusses the robustness of these results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Brief literature review

Social capital and development
When one goes through the literature on social capital, it is immediately apparent that trust, social networks, and social norms are the main mechanisms through which social capital reduces uncertainty and transaction costs, discourages opportunistic behavior, fosters cooperation and increases the efficiency of markets and organizations, thus affecting economic development. Indeed, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) argue that social capital is growth enhancing mainly because a) it improves the functioning of public institutions and b) it helps to offset the effects of market imperfections by reducing search costs and facilitating economic transactions. Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) ,
for instance, present a theoretical model where social capital affects economic growth by facilitating cooperative trade.
The influential paper by Zak and Knack (2001) formalizes the ideas previously outlined and develops a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and moral hazard to determine how trust varies across societies. Agents decide how much to save and the time they will spend in investigating brokers who have an incentive to cheat their clients. Of course, cheaters are not trustworthy and face sanctions by formal institutions and informal institutions (e.g. social ties, religious institutions) which are modeled as 'distance' or similarities between people. This, in turn prevents cheating and affects the time agents spend in verifying cheaters' actions. In this set-up, trust enhances growth by increasing savings and lowering transaction costs. The model also implies that trust increases with both formal and informal institutions, homogenous population and more egalitarian societies. In addition, the model predicts that societies can get stuck in lowtrust poverty traps.
As far as the empirical evidence on the link between social capital and development is concerned, Knack and Keefer (1997) using cross-country data find that trust and civic norms are significantly related to economic growth and investment. Knack (2002) finds that social trust leads to better governance. Zak and Knack (2001) Sabatini (2006) , indicators such as blood donation and electoral participation might be outcomes of social capital rather than a measure of social capital itself. Garretsen et al. (2004) also show that, after controlling for legal norms, societal norms help to explain market capitalization and hence crosscountry differences in financial development. They obtain their indicators for social norms from survey data about the values of people working in local subsidiaries of IBM in more than 50 countries.
In addition, social capital may influence social learning and information diffusion through reducing the cost of information acquisition, lessening the uncertainty regarding the reliability of the information and increasing the willingness to cooperate and share information. Barr (2000) presents a model where networks facilitate knowledge flows between firms and as a result, firm productivity increases which might lead to sustained growth. Her empirical analysis for the manufacturing sector in Ghana shows that entrepreneurs with large and more diverse networks have firms that are more productive because they benefit not only from their direct contacts but also from the networking of their contacts. Katungi and Smale (2006) draw attention to a gender twist in the way that social capital influences information exchanged among rural households in Uganda.
Male-headed households participate more in civic engagement and social institutions than their female counterparts do, so they have more access to information and an advantage on agricultural innovation to improve the productivity of bananas.
We will see next that unlike the large literature linking social capital and growth, research relating social capital and HIV/AIDS is still very scarce.
HIV/AIDS and development
There is an emerging consensus that HIV/AIDS (mortality and morbidity) is an impediment to growth. However, the specific channels through which HIV/AIDS affects growth are subject to recent research 2 .
Most of the empirical simulations, like the one by Cuddington (1993) for Tanzania, are based in Solow type growth models where HIV/AIDS affects the size of the labor force, increases expenditure on health, decreases both public and private savings, decreases investment in physical capital and lowers productivity.
In addition to these more evident effects, HIV/AIDS contributes to the persistence of poverty as it affects not only the stock, but also the accumulation of human capital. Besides the direct health costs of the disease, the nature and the way HIV/AIDS is transmitted has mainly created: a) social stigma and discrimination frequently attached to infected individuals which threaten to break family and community ties (Gaffeo, 2003) and b) market failures because of asymmetric information and externalities (Gersovitz and Hammer, 2003) . The scope for public intervention arises from the uncertainty regarding individuals' infection status and the impossibility of verifying if one's partner is engaging in safe sex with someone that has a positive probability of being infected 4 .
Recall that in Zak and Knack (2001) , uncertainty, asymmetric information and moral hazard implies resources diverted in 'uncovering' cheaters instead of increasing output. They also show that discrimination ('dissimilar agents') lowers trust and consequently lowers growth. Similarly, in the case of HIV/AIDS, uncertainty and asymmetric information and the impossibility of monitoring sexual behavior have both a direct effect on human lives (and output) and an indirect effect through trust. Moreover, the epidemic is also associated with stigma and discrimination, which also lowers trust.
That is, there is a direct and indirect link between HIV/AIDS and development.
In addition, a number of authors argue that HIV/AIDS also poses a considerable burden on traditional networks and coping mechanisms, in particular in what concerns care for orphans and sick individuals. Foster (2006) for instance, argues that governments have been slow to react to the orphan crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa that is intimately linked to the epidemic causing families and communities to, in his words, "shoulder most of the effort and costs". This strain on social networks could lead to a negative impact on social capital or even to the disintegration of the existing informal mechanisms to cope with economic shocks.
Besides the impact of HIV/AIDS on households, Haacker (2004) posits that HIV/AIDS can also influence the 'social fabric' of the country (e.g. social coherence and governance), which in turn could affect economic development. He argues that the epidemic contributes to deteriorating security at the individual, community and national level, in particular as governments' capacities are eroded leading to increased crime and instability. This author also states that the epidemic could increase the vulnerability of a country to civil war.
Others instead, have studied the effect of social capital on health. For instance, Poortinga (2006) shows that for European countries, individual levels of social trust and civic participation were strongly correlated with self-rated health. Campbell et al. (2002) focus on the impact of social capital on health issues in a South African mining community. Social capital is defined in terms of people's membership in voluntary 4 See Dasgupta (2005) for a discussion on trust and credibility and the role of an external enforcer.
community associations and they tested if members were less likely to have HIV. They found mixed results that varied across age and gender.
Overall, one can conclude that HIV/AIDS affects growth directly but also indirectly through fertility, human capital and social capital. In terms of social capital, the epidemic increases insecurity, stigma and discrimination and poses extra burdens on traditional social networks The question that we will attempt to answer in subsequent sections is how large and strong this effect is. This will allow us to assess the importance of this indirect channel through which HIV/AIDS affects the development process.
Regression framework and overview of the data
To explore if HIV determines social capital, we will present the results from a number of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of the form
where α is the constant, is a vector containing other explanatory variables, and
ε is a random error term. The estimated coefficient β measures how sensitive social capital is to HIV prevalence and it is of particular interest to us.
Firstly, to test the above model we need to have a reasonable measure of social capital. Durlauf (2002) and Sabatini (2006) Survey (WVS) and shows that although trust, norms and networks tend to co-vary, there are distinct elements. More interestingly, he explores the sensitivity of these components by including each one as regressors in cross-country regressions and finds that only the social trust component is robust to different specifications. He obtains similar qualitative results when using the variable "trust" from the WVS, which was also used by Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zack and Knack (2001) in their growth regressions.
Nonetheless, one has to acknowledge that this particular measure of social capital has been subject to a number of criticisms in the literature. One concern relates to the fact that it reflects individual perceptions of society and that one needs to take into 5 Sabatini (2006) observes that urban areas and better educated persons are usually overrepresented in the WVS but Delhey and Newton (2005) argue that these problems do not seriously affect the randomness of the sample. Knack and Keefer (1997) provides empirical validity for the use of WVS data when they found a strong correlation between WVS trust and the number of wallets that were 'lost' and returned intact in an experiment carried out in Europe and the United States.
account the social and historical context in which those perceptions are formed and the timing when the survey questions were asked. Other caveats relate to the different interpretations respondents might have of the question asked and their perception of trust given dissimilar risk preferences (i.e. those who are more risk averse may be less likely to trust others).
Secondly, we need to identify the other correlates of trust. We collected data on a number of determinants of trust that we identified in the existing literature and discussed in the previous section. Those include HIV prevalence rates, governance indexes, measures of the quality of institutions (in particular regarding the control of corruption) and measures of social distance such as income inequality, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. We also control for population density because spatial distance may negatively affect the formation of networks and the flow of information. However, areas with high population density can overwhelm public services and are likely to display more heterogeneity and lower trust. What is more, population density has been associated with higher levels of crime. In addition, people living in rural areas are said to be more trusting than people living in large urban areas (Collier, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005) . Note that Japan is a country with high population density, large urban areas and low levels of crime. Therefore, the strength and sign of the correlation between population density and trust are by no means clear. Like Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) , we include measures of educational achievement as determinants of trust. Using individual level data for the United States, they find that "successful people" in terms of income and educational achievement tend to trust more.
We also included the log of initial GDP (as measured by Dollar and Kraay, 2002) as a possible determinant of trust in some specifications. In the Zak and Knack (2001) moral hazard model, trust is decreasing with wealth but increasing in wages 6 . Following this logic, the impact of the log of initial GDP (the proxy for those two economic factors at the national level) on trust is ambiguous.
Finally note that there is empirical evidence conducted for America (Glaeser et al, 2002) and Britain (Li et al, 2005) showing that generalized trust tends to increase with age. Younger adults seem to be less trusting than middle age or older because of Appendix B provides more description of data and sources. Appendix C presents the correlation matrix between the main regressors as well as their descriptive statistics.
Some variables are highly correlated and we should bear this in mind when performing our regression. This is particularly the case for variables measuring institutional quality.
Note as well that the developing country indicator is negative and highly correlated with both the measures of institutional quality and initial income; an initial income is highly positively correlated with variables measuring institutional quality.
Empirical results
Many econometric difficulties are likely to arise when estimating cross-country regressions of the determinants of national levels of social capital (measured by trust) and might result in biased and inconsistent estimates. Note that UNAIDS has warned against comparing HIV/AIDS prevalence data across time because the assumptions, methodology and data used to produce the estimates change over time with improved knowledge of the disease and superior statistical methods 10 . For this reason and given problems of data availability, we are unable to use panel data (or at least specify our regression in first differences) to control for possible unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. correlation between unobserved and observed country characteristics).
Omitted variables could present another serious potential problem so we try to control for the different determinants of trust identified in the literature. Perhaps more worrying is the possible endogeneity of the HIV prevalence rate. We attempt to mitigate this problem by ensuring that whenever possible, this variable is pre-determined i.e. we include values for periods before the WVS surveys took place. In addition, we also estimate the model using instrumental variables (IV). Finally, among other difficulties, the presence of multiple regimes and non-linearities in the relationships studied is a clear possibility.
Bearing those caveats in mind, Zak and Knack (2001) in settings with a large number of small groups, no single group represents much of a threat to others; therefore, the effective social distance is greatest at an intermediate range of the fractionalization measure. The results were qualitatively similar 11 , the fractionalization variables were statistically insignificant but HIV prevalence and the rule of law variable are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Specifications (7) through (11) regress trust on HIV prevalence, rule of law index, the Gini coefficient for income inequality as a proxy for social distance, the log of initial income, population density and average age of the population. Rule of law has always a positive and significant effect on trust except in (9) when we include (the log of) initial income because, as stated earlier, both variables are highly correlated.
Unexpectedly, the estimated coefficient of educational achievement has a negative sign although statistically insignificant. Similar to other studies, we find that the Gini 11 Not reported in table1 for ease of exposition , but available upon request coefficient is an important determinant of trust 12 (i.e. greater income inequality reduces trust). We find a significant and negative relation between population density and trust.
But our results suggest that countries with older populations seem to trust less. This contrasts with the findings of researchers like Li et al (2005) who found that older people are more trusting than younger people are because they have higher levels of neighborhood attachment and civic participation. On the other hand, it is possible that as people grow older, their life experience make them less naïve and less trusting.
We also report (but do not present in Table 1 ) that we estimated specifications that included the percentage of rural population in 1996 from the World Development
Indicators as a regressor. In most cases, the estimated coefficient had the expected positive sign but was not statistically significant across different specifications. We also explore different measures of "age" such as the ratio of population below 30 years old to population above 30 years old. These results consistently suggested that older populations trust more but they were not statistically significant.
The RESET test for specifications (10) and (11) 12 In specification (10), the estimated coefficient of Gini is statistically significant at the 12% significance level. 13 The test was written by Lawrence C. Hamilton and it is available in the Stata software.
of the residuals at the 13% level 14 . The HIV prevalence variable presents a negative coefficient varying in size from -0.373 to -0.610 indicating that a one standard deviation increase in HIV prevalence will lead to at least 1 percentage point decline in trust after controlling for other determinants of social capital.
The regressions presented in table 1 provide some support to the empirical relation between HIV prevalence and trust. However, one has to bear in mind that the findings are subject to a number of caveats, including the possibility that the estimates are subject to endogeneity bias. Next, in table 2, we perform some additional tests to assess whether there is a fundamental change in the conclusions obtained, when we vary the specifications along various dimensions.
As argued by Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) , robustness is a multi-dimensional concept that cannot be analyzed using a single indicator. In this section, we will use the term "robustness" as referring to our attempt to assess whether the results obtained in the previous section are sensitive to how the dependent variable is measured, changes in the explanatory variables used, to changes in the sample composition, and to the use of different econometric techniques. We will concentrate in particular on the statistical significance and size of the estimated effect of HIV prevalence on trust.
First, using our most general specification (11), we include alternative measures of institutional quality. HIV prevalence is negative and statistically significant when including government effectiveness (12) or the voice and accountability variable (13) constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2006) , but it is only statistically significant at the 13% level 15 when using the law and order index (14) constructed by ICRG in the period from 1960-1995. The size of the HIV estimated coefficient is similar to our previous results (10-11a).
Subsequently, we limit the sample included in the regressions to developing countries exclusively, in order to check whether by considering only this sub-sample, one would observe changes in the results previously obtained. In fact, specification (15) 14 We report that changing the definition of the dependent variable from the percentage "among the interviewees who answered the trust question" to the percentage of trusting respondents among "all people interviewed including the don't know and missing" does not change the results qualitatively. The HIV estimated coefficient is -0.579 and statistically significant at the 2% level.
shows that most regressors are no longer statistically significant; nonetheless, HIV prevalence continues to present a negative and significant estimated coefficient 16 . The estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in HIV prevalence is associated with 0.5 percentage point reduction in social capital.
Furthermore, we attempt to account for the fact that HIV prevalence might be endogenous to social capital by instrumenting for this variable using national data for male circumcision rates obtained from WHO (2007) where the RESET test cannot reject the null of no misspecification at 10% level. 16 We also tested the same specification but using government effectiveness or control of corruption instead of rule of law with similar results. 17 The estimated coefficient of HIV prevalence is 9% smaller when controlling for Scandinavian instead of Nordic.
Specifications (16) and (17) Although the Shea first stage partial R 2 and the Cragg-Donaldson F test show that our instrumental variables are not weak, we are aware of the possibility that circumcision rates are endogenous to national trust levels for religious or cultural reasons. If so, circumcision rates might not be an adequate instrument because it may be related to trust.
In (18) we use Sub-Saharan Africa as the only instrumental variable and we obtain similar qualitative results as in (17).
In addition, we follow a large strand of the literature on the impact of institutions on economic development by using the log of settler mortality as an instrument for institutional quality as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2001) . Specification (19) is a 3SLS regression of trust on HIV prevalence (instrumented by Sub-Saharan Africa), control of corruption (instrumented by settler mortality) and the Gini coefficient. The HIV prevalence and the Gini coefficient have the expected sign and are statistically significant whereas control of corruption is not. Nonetheless, one should interpret these results with caution given the very small sample size (we have data available for only 28 countries).
As a final check, we use instrumental variables on the sample of developing countries (20, 22) . Similar to our OLS estimates, HIV prevalence remains statistically significant but the rule of law variable and Gini coefficient are not. It would have been desirable to test if HIV affects the change in the stock of social capital but unfortunately, our data is not rich enough to disentangle between stock and flows effects.
Lastly, we report that although income inequality appears to be insignificantly correlated to trust in our 2SLS estimations, inspection of all our first stage regressions shows that Gini affects HIV prevalence positively and significantly. Other authors such as Drain et al (2004) for developing countries, Plot et al (2007) for Africa for the United States have also found that, among other variables, income inequality predicts HIV prevalence (or AIDS for the United States). That is, income inequality might be affecting social capital indirectly through HIV/AIDS. This interesting relationship needs to be explained and explored further.
Overall and given the limitations in quality and availability of data, our exploratory analysis provide empirical support to the idea that HIV/AIDS has a harmful effect on social capital. Indeed, HIV/AIDS might considerably restrict development through this important channel.
Conclusion
The cross-country analysis performed in this study indicates that the notion that HIV/AIDS has deleterious effects on social capital at the country level has empirical support. Our preferred specifications suggest that the effect of HIV on social capital is of 
